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ABSTRACT. The attractive feature of the Everett approach is its admirable spirit of 
approaching the quantum puzzle with a Zen-like "beginner’s mind" in order to try to 
envision what the pure formalism might be saying about quantum reality, even if that 
journey leads to a strange place. It is argued that the transactional interpretation of 
quantum mechanics (TI), appropriately interpreted, shares the same motivation and 
achieves much more, with far fewer conceptual perplexities, by taking into account 
heretofore overlooked features of the quantum formalism itself (i.e. advanced states).  In 
particular, TI does not need to talk about brain states, consciousness, or observers 
(rational or otherwise). In its possibilist variant (“PTI”), it shares the realist virtues of 
treating state vector branches as genuine dynamical entities, without having to explain 
how or why all of their associated outcomes actually happen (they don’t), how to account 
for a plenitude of counterpart observers in some coherent notion of trans-temporal 
identity of the bifurcating observers (observers don’t bifurcate in TI), nor how the 
certainty of all outcomes could be consistent with any coherent theory of probability, let 
alone the Born probability (the Born probability emerges naturally in TI). In short, TI is 
precisely the one-world interpretation Kent is looking for in his (2010). 
 
 
1. Introduction. 
 
 This paper will argue that the decades-long endeavor to explicate and fulfill Hugh 
Everett III’s  “Relative State Interpretation” (Everett 1957), while admirable in its 
motivation, determination and ingenuity, is nevertheless ill-fated, and that its original 
promise of a minimalist but faithful interpretation of quantum theory would be better 
fulfilled through a similarly open-minded and fervently dedicated exploration of 
Cramer’s Transactional Interpretation (TI) (1980, 1986, 2005, 2006a,b; Kastner (2006, 
2008, 2010).  
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 Kent (2010)  has recently provided a carefully considered and somewhat gloomy 
assessment of the prospects for successfully fulfilling the Everettian program. While he 
expresses optimism “that we can find simpler one-world versions of quantum theory that 
have all the aforementioned virtues [‘a well defined Lorentz covariant physical ontology 
that adds little or no arbitrary structure to the mathematics of quantum theory and that 
reproduces all the scientific successes of Copenhagen quantum theory within its domain 
of validity']  and none of the problems that afflict, and I think ultimately doom, the 
Everett program,"  he goes on to suggest (somewhat ominously, in this author’s view) 
that "the failure of the Everett program adds to the likelihood that the fundamental 
problem is not our inability to interpret quantum theory correctly but rather a limitation of 
quantum theory itself." (2010, 2 (preprint version))  
 
The primary aims of this paper are (1) to follow up on Kent’s optimism 
concerning a simpler one-word interpretation and (2) to dispel the notion that quantum 
theory might need ad hoc “fixing” because we are having trouble understanding its 
message about reality.  Concerning (2), the situation is not that desperate: we do have the 
resources to make sense out of quantum theory in its well-corroborated pure form. We 
just need to reconsider a perfectly viable interpretation (TI) which has received 
insufficient attention, probably due to the particular kind of conceptual challenge it 
represents (i.e., time symmetry). Yet if current researchers are willing to countenance 
such admittedly ‘fantastic’ (Kent’s term)  or speculative features as bifurcating worlds 
and observers, ‘probability’ redefined as not requiring uncertainty about outcome 
1
, 
observer-dependent and ultimately subjective divisions of the world into ‘system’, 
‘observer’, and ‘environment’,
2
 the application of social philosophy and decision theory 
to subjectively defined ‘rational’ observers to try to derive purely physical laws such as 
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As Peter Lewis (2007)  notes, “Greaves (2004, 426–427) suggests giving up the assumption that a 
subjective probability measure [the weights appearning in the set of possible outcomes] over future events 
requires uncertainty about what will happen, and Wallace (2006, 672–673) suggests giving up the 
assumption that uncertainty requires some fact about which one is uncertain”.   
2
 As discussed in Schlosshauer (2007, 102) 
Born probabilities, etc.
3
, then surely they might be willing to reconsider a historically 
neglected interpretation, especially if it makes much (if not all) of the foregoing 
unnecessary.  
To review the basics of TI:  an emitter emits an offer wave (OW) which formally 
corresponds to the usual quantum state vector.  Depending on the experimental 
arrangement, components of the OW (these would be analogous to “branches of the state 
vector in MWI) may be absorbed by one or more absorbers, each of which responds by 
sending an advanced (time-reversed) confirmation wave (CW) back to the emitter. (There 
is no counterpart of the CW in MWI or in any other prevailing interpretation, and that, it 
is suggested here, is the crucial missing ingredient in other attempts to interpret quantum 
theory.
4
) If there are N such CW responses, there are N incipient transactions in the form 
of OW/CW superpositions. The amplitude of the ith  CW ( i = [1, N])  at the locus of the 
emitter is equal to the Born probability, |<φi|ψ>|
2
,  of the outcome <φi|  represented by the 
absorber in question conditional on the emitter state |ψ>, which provides an immediate 
and unambiguous  physical basis for the Born rule. So right away, we do away with any 
need for increasingly sophisticated, yet endlessly disputable, applications of decision 
theory and social philosophy to what may or may not be rational observers, in support of 
claims that such persons would probably arrive at the Born rule.  
 
 As noted above, the big conceptual barrier blocking many researchers from 
seriously considering TI is its time-symmetry: TI allows what Price (1997) terms 
“advanced action” in the form of confirmation waves;  that is,  physical influences (of 
limited scope) operating in a time-reversed direction.  It is commonly thought that such 
influences must give rise to causal paradoxes, conflicts with relativity, or other 
inconsistencies. A specific example of such an assessment was Tim Maudlin’s argument 
(1996, 2002) based on a “contingent absorber”-type thought experiment. In this 
experiment, one confirmation wave component for a slow-moving massive particle which 
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 As discussed in extensive detail in Kent (2010). 
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 The Bohmian interpretation does not suffer from the specific problem described here, but its account of 
the Born probability certainly falls short of the elegance and economy of TI’s account. 
is emitted in the form of offer waves (OW)  in two possible directions (one to a near 
detector and one to a moveable farther detector behind it) would only be present if the 
nearby transaction failed, and the farther detector was then swung over to intercept the 
particle. Thus the farther detector’s ability to return a CW was contingent on 
nondetection of the particle at the nearby detector. Maudlin then argued that the 
probability of detection based on this CW was only ½ , yet the particle was certain to be 
detected there, which seemed inconsistent; and also, that the “pseudotime” account given 
by Cramer (1986) could not provide a coherent account of the process. 
  
 However, Maudlin’s objection has been answered by three different authors since 
then, all of them providing apparently reasonable ways for TI to remain viable in the face 
of this objection. Berkowitz (2002) argued that the Maudlin example constituted  a causal 
loop, and argued that detection frequencies need not equal theoretical probabilities in the 
case of causal loops. Kastner (2006) argued that the Maudlin account argued against the 
original pseudotime account in Cramer (1986) but that this was merely a heuristic device 
and not fundamentally constitutive of TI; and that the core of TI was that the probability 
of an outcome was given by the weight of the incipient transactions, an approach which 
can be given a perfectly coherent account in a “big space” account of probability.
5
  
Cramer (2005) resurrected his “pseudotime” approach by proposing that all we need in 
such cases is a hierarchy in which possible transactions with shorter spacetime intervals 
have ontological priority over those with longer spacetime intervals, so that the nearby 
incipient transaction’s outcome would have to be decided “before” (in pseudotime) other 
transactions could enter the competition. While one might not necessarily fully endorse 
any one of these proposals, it seems clear that, in view of three different ways to counter 
the Maudlin argument, his 1996 summary pronouncement of TI’s “collapse” was at least 
premature.
6
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 As defined in Placek and Butterfield (2002), Section 3.3. 
6
 The present author is currently exploring yet another promising approach to address this type of 
“contingent absorber “ objection based on dynamical properties of de Broglie waves. 
 
  In a recent paper (Kastner 2010), the present author argued that the best way to 
understand TI is in terms of a (modal) realist view of offer and confirmation waves
7
. This 
approach, termed therein “possibilist TI” (PTI), takes what Everettians would call 
“branches” of the state vector as representing real dynamical possibilities whose 
collective structure is described by Hilbert space (or Fock space in the relativistic 
domain). Thus PTI already has much in common with the “Many Worlds” versions of 
Everett (MWI) which view branches of the state vector as real worlds in a “multiverse.”  
The crucial differences between PTI and MWI are that in PTI, (1) absorbers play an equal 
role with emitters via time-reversed influences, as discussed above and (2) state vectors 
are viewed as physically real possibilities (but not actualities as in MWI).   
 
The remainder of this paper will further explicate feature (2) and argue that PTI 
retains essentially all the virtues of Many Worlds Interpretations (MWI) while avoiding 
essentially all of the problems. 
 
2.   The message of QM: possibility as a physically real resource. 
 
In support of an explicit many-worlds picture, David Deutsch has said:  
“....quantum computers provide irresistible evidence that the Multiverse is 
real. One especially convincing argument is provided by quantum 
algorithms ... which calculate more intermediate results in the course of a 
single computation than there are atoms in the visible universe. When a 
quantum computer delivers the output of such a computation, we shall 
know that those intermediate results must have been computed 
somewhere, because they were needed to produce the right answer. So I 
issue this challenge to those who still cling to a single-universe 
worldview: if the universe we see around us is all there is, where are 
quantum computations performed? I have yet to receive a plausible reply.” 
(1998) 
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 OW and CW  are represented in PTI by pure state vectors (kets and bras respectively), rather than wave 
functions, the latter implying an a priori particular basis which is not appropriate in TI. 
Deutsch is right: the universe is more than what we see around us, but that does 
not mean that it has to be a multiverse in which there are literally actual world 
counterparts to our own and in which all possible outcomes are actualized.  The portion 
that we  do not see, and which is responsible for the power of quantum computing over 
classical computing, can instead be interpreted as that which is real but not actualized: 
dynamical possibilities. That is, quantum computations can be processed through the 
medium of dynamical interacting possibilities without those processes having to be 
considered as actualized, observable outcomes. We don’t need actualized intermediate 
outcomes in order to have physical room for these quantum computations, which can go 
on perfectly well (indeed, better)
8
 “behind the scenes” to give rise to a final, actualized 
output. In PTI, the output is what is detected (actualized) based on absorption of the post-
computation OW and the ensuing CW which provides for a transaction. The intermediate 
stages can be carried out by undetected offer waves (OW). So, all we have to do to reap 
the benefits of MWI without the problems is to consider branches of the state vector as 
real, yet not actual (the only actualized outcome being the final detected result). 
 
This application of possibilist realism to quantum theory has ample (but 
overlooked) precedent in Heisenberg’s comment:  
 
``The probability wave of Bohr, Kramers, Slater...was a quantitative 
version of the old concept of  “potentia” in Aristotelian philosophy. It 
introduced something standing in the middle between the idea of an event 
and the actual event, a strange kind of physical reality just in the middle 
between possibility and reality. (Heisenberg (2007), p. 15) 
 
Heisenberg never really pursued this bit of physical insight, but the PTI approach 
is to take his suggestion seriously: the state vector (an “offer wave” in TI) represents a 
kind of physical reality: that is, physically real possibilities “standing in the middle 
between the idea of an event and the actual event” which can interact with each other and 
with physical potentials and give rise to an actualized event by “setting the stage” for 
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 That is, one could argue that it is the uncommitted (to a particular basis) nature of the offer wave which 
gives it its flexibility and thus its ability to explore “all possibilities at once.” 
possible transactions, through which energy and other conserved quantities are 
transferred. It is these pre-detection interactions on the level of possibility which provide 
the extra information responsible for quantum computing’s power. 
  
Here is another way to understand the power and efficacy of the  “mere 
possibilities” represented by quantum states. Consider a hydrogen atom. The state vector 
of the electron can be seen as describing many possible positions (or momenta or some 
combination thereof) for the electron, but when no measurement is made on the 
electron—when it is not detected—its state can be considered a possibility wave 
“somewhere in the middle between possibility and actuality” in the sense described by 
Heisenberg above. In TI terms, it is an unabsorbed offer wave. Yet that “mere 
possibility” is incredibly powerful—powerful enough to support the structure of matter 
and to provide its apparent solidity. Note that in his (1998), Deutsch wants to describe 
such an electron as existing in all his many (interfering) worlds—being actualized in all 
possible different outcomes in each world. But since no observational basis has been 
specified, are these many worlds ones in which the electron has a definite (more 
precisely, narrowly localized) position, i.e. a splitting with respect to the position basis? 
Or momentum? 
9
  How much simpler it is to just view the state vector as representing a 
real and potent (if not ‘actual’) entity sufficient in itself, uncommitted to any particular 
basis.  Again, the point is that we don’t need to posit actualized worlds corresponding to 
specific outcomes (and then have to worry about the ambiguity of basis for these 
outcomes) to get the job done, if we view possibilities—represented by state vectors--as 
having dynamic potency.  
  
Admittedly, there is  “collapse” in TI (or PTI). But note that the collapse is 
completely “defanged” compared to the usual notion of collapse. First, there is no need 
                                                 
9
 Of course, position and momentum are Fourier transforms of each other; eigenfunctions of the “position 
basis” are commonly understood to be represented by Dirac delta functions. In either case you need an 
infinite number of worlds of one kind to correspond to an eigenstate of the complementary observable. 
for an observer: collapse occurs anytime an emitter receives one or more CW in response 
to an OW. The new interpretational ingredient that “cuts the Gordian knot” of the 
apparent observer-dependence of quantum phenomena is the taking into account of  the 
dynamical role of absorbers on an equal footing with emitters. Thus TI is an “observer-
free collapse interpretation” in Bub’s terms (1997). In TI, collapse is not observer-
dependent but simply absorber-dependent.  
 
Without including the role of the absorber, all we have is an offer wave (the 
“quantum state”) that never gets a response, so it is typically considered to be 
propagating endlessly out into the world, continually being amplified depending on what 
it happens to encounter: a geiger counter; a cat; an observer; Wigner; Wigner’s Friend; 
Alice; Bob; etc; etc;. ad infinitum. Without taking absorbers into account, there is no 
principled way to call a halt to this proliferating, ever-amplifying quantum state. In the 
farthest extreme, we have the “universal state vector” unitarily propagating ever onward, 
so that (from a God’s eye view), allegedly nothing ever “really” happens. Thus  arises  
the necessity to consider arbitrary divisions of the universal state vector into “observer” 
and “observed.” All of this is avoided in TI: absorbers provide the confirmation waves 
that give rise to incipient transactions (four-vector superpositions of OW and CW) and 
thus trigger collapses (actualized transactions), bringing clear and decisive closure to 
state vectors at appropriate levels. Such actualized transactions will furthermore naturally 
line up with decoherence arguments, since decoherence, taking into account as it does the 
total environment of a system, is fundamentally based on what kinds of absorbers are 
available to emitted particles. 
 
3. What is the “pure” theory and why does TI address it effectively? 
 
 In Everett’s view and that of his followers, the “pure theory” is only the  unitary 
evolution of the state vector, without the projection postulate. But an important part of the 
theory—the part that allows it to make empirical contact with experience—is the Born 
Rule. Thus the “pure theory” should properly be considered to be the combination of 
linear evolution of the state vector with the Born Rule. The Born Rule cannot just be 
tacked on as an afterthought: it is a crucial component of the theory, just as a crucial part 
of electromagnetic theory is that the electrical (or magnetic) energy of the field is 
proportional to the square of the field. Nobody would try to interpret electromagnetic 
theory by initially ignoring the expression for electrical energy just because 
(hypothetically) it was not clear how that quantity was physically related to the field, and 
then trying to account for the energy after the fact by considering “FAPP”-type 
explanations such as what a rational observer might expect to bet on when making 
decisions about electric field-based phenomena. The genuine interpretational challenge 
would be to understand how the electrical energy is physically related to the field. The 
same challenge applies to quantum theory: how is the probability for outcomes physically 
related to the state vector? Everettian approaches can give no answer in these terms, as 
Kent’s discussion makes clear. 
 
 So the pure theory properly consists of both the linear evolution of the state vector 
and the well-corroborated empirical link with experience, the Born Rule. We need a 
physical explanation for the Born Rule. TI provides a simple and elegant one: the Born 
Rule corresponds to the final amplitude of the CW at the locus of the emitter. Since it is 
the transaction  based on that CW component which may, or may not, result in 
actualization of the corresponding outcome, we have a genuinely probabilistic situation: 
an objectively uncertain result whose probability is precisely the amplitude of the CW at 
the emitter.  
  
4. Conclusion: TI deserves serious and open-minded reconsideration. 
 
 It has been argued that there is in fact a perfectly viable one-world (one actual 
world, that is) interpretation that can potentially fulfill Kent’s requirements for “a 
mathematically elegant, universally applicable, Lorentz invariant, scientifically adequate 
[interpretation] of quantum theory that supplies a well-defined realist ontology.” (Kent 
2010, 2).  As noted in the Abstract, TI approaches the total formalism--the combination 
of the linear unitary evolution and the Born Rule--with a “Beginner’s Mind”  and tries to 
see what the formalism is really telling us. Clearly, the mathematics expresses a 
symmetry of retarded and advanced solutions, and truly “letting the formalism speak” 
means not assuming that part of it (the advanced part) should be ignored because it 
doesn’t fit our preconceptions about the “flow of time.”  Taking into account the full 
content of the formalism,  TI provides the following: a straightforward, simple and 
elegant account of the Born Rule; an observer-free account of collapse; the collapse is 
Lorentz-invariant since it occurs either atemporally or all along a spatiotemporal four-
vector (depending on one’s ontological interpretation);  a realist ontology in terms of 
possibilist realism, thus providing a clear answer to “where all the computation takes 
place” in quantum computing. It potentially opens a door to an entirely new and exciting 
understanding of physical reality worthy of the great empirical successes of quantum 
theory: namely, that the world around us is seething with unactualized, but nevertheless 
real and potent, physical  possibility. While no pretense has been made here that the 
ontology of TI (in Cramer’s account) or PTI (in Kastner’s account) is completely worked 
out, it seems clear that there is much fruitful ground to explore. The present author hopes 
that some of the great minds currently engaged in what (to her and apparently to others as 
well, e.g. Kent) appears to be a losing battle with the Everett approach will consider 
devoting themselves instead to exploring the exciting possibilities inherent in Cramer’s 
Transactional Interpretation. 
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